Unblocking Frozen Assets - A Simple Solution by Hottle, Douglas M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 2 Article 6 
1993 
Unblocking Frozen Assets - A Simple Solution 
Douglas M. Hottle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Douglas M. Hottle, Unblocking Frozen Assets - A Simple Solution, 31 Duq. L. Rev. 329 (1993). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol31/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Unblocking Frozen Assets-A Simple Solution
INTRODUCTION
The scenario is one that occurs many times each day. A United
States business ("business") contracts with a foreign government
to design and assemble machinery for export to the foreign nation.
A letter of credit is used to secure payment.' In many cases, spe-
cific funds are deposited by the foreign government in an Ameri-
can bank account to cover payments under the letter of credit.
However, at this point 'in the scenario, before the business can
complete its contractual obligation, or immediately after the obli-
gation has been completed and before payment has been made, the
United States government, by executive order, freezes the assets of
the foreign nation present in the United States, thus, preventing
the business from receiving payment for its services.
Until very recently, a business holding such a contractual claim
-against a foreign government generally assumed that the frozen as-
sets could not be reached to satisfy its claim until such time as the
United States government decided to release the funds. Such pes-
simism proved well-grounded since Cuban assets have been frozen
for more then twenty-five years and Korean assets have been
blocked for more than fifty years.
2
1. A letter of credit involves three parties: (1) an issuer (generally a bank) who
agrees to pay conforming drafts presented under the letter of credit; (2) a bank customer or
"account party" who orders the letter of credit and dictates the terms; and (3) a beneficiary
to whom the letter of credit is issued, who can collect monies under the letter of credit by
presenting drafts and making proper demand on the issuer. Arbest Construction Company
v First National Bank & Trust, 777 F2d 581, 583 (10th Cir 1985).
From the seller's standpoint, the greatest advantage of a letter of credit is that the
obligation of the bank to honor the beneficiary's demand for payment is independent
from the willingness or the ability of the buyer to pay for the goods . . . the bank
issuing the letter of credit is unconcerned with the seller's actual performance of the
contract sale.
George M. Armstrong, Jr., Letters of Credit in East-West Trade: Soviet Reception of Capi-
talist Custom, 17 Vand J Transnatl L 329, 338 (1984).
Letters of credit evolved out of the simultaneous needs of merchants for certainty in
both payment and delivery in an expanding international trade market. [Tihe letter
reduces the risk of the extension of credit over time and distance.
Steven R. Berger, The Effects of Issuing Bank Insolvency on Letters of Credit, 21 Harv Intl
L J 161 (Winter 1980).
2. See, for example 31 CFR § 515 (1991)(Cuban assets frozen for more than twenty-
329
330 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 31:329
The primary purpose of an asset freeze is to punish the offend-
ing foreign nation by preventing it from obtaining economic bene-
fits from transactions with American citizens, and by holding its
assets both for use as a political bargaining chip and as a source of
compensation for claims Americans may have against that foreign
nation.3
A burgeoning growth in international trade and the increasing
use of asset freezes and trade embargoes by the United States gov-
ernment has galvanized businesses to attempt to unblock frozen
assets in order to satisfy contractual claims.4 Several attempts have
proven successful and, although the routes are circuitous and litig-
ious, many businesses, spurred by approaching statute of limita-
tion deadlines, have joined the fray to unblock frozen assets in or-
der to satisfy contractual claims.
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
Through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("IEEPA"), first promulgated in 1977, the United States Congress
delegated to the President certain powers for regulating foreign ec-
onomic transactions during times of national emergency.6 The
IEEPA, coupled with the amended version of the Trading with the
Enemy Act ("TWEA"), form the principal vehicles by which the
United States government may impose asset freezes or trade em-
bargoes against a foreign nation.7 These statutes are legislatively
intertwined to promote a protective barrier preventing foreign
five years); 31 CFR § 520 (1991)(Korean assets frozen for more than fifty years).
3. Centrifugal Casting Machine Company v Government of Iran, 966 F2d 1348,
1350-51 (10th Cir 1992).
4. A listing of recent asset freezes include: 31 CFR § 535 (1991)(Iranian Asset Con-
trol Regulations, effective 1979); 31 CFR § 540 (1991)(Nicaragua, effective 1985); 31 CFR §
545 (1991)(South Africa, effective 1985); 31 CFR § 550 (1991)(Libya, effective 1986); 31 CFR
§ 565 (1991)(Panama, effective 1988); and 31 CFR § 575 (1991)(Iraq, effective 1990).
5. The statute of limitation for contract claims will vary in accordance with the law
of the requisite forum state. See generally Centrifugal, 966 F2d at 1351 n 3 (court applied
substantive law of Oklahoma in suit seeking to recover under letter of credit); and Engel
Industries, Inc. v Medcon, 1992 WL 157273 at 1-3 (D DC)(court applied Missouri's codifica-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code in suit seeking recovery under letter of credit).
6. 50 USC §§ 1701-06 (1992).
7. 50 USC App § 5(b)(1991). Since 1977, the scope of the TWEA has been limited to
times of war. Compare 50 USC App § 5(b) with superseded statute 50 USC App §
5(b)(1)(1976). The presidential powers set forth in section 203 of the IEEPA are triggered
by a finding of "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or econ-
omy of the United States . . . . 50 USC § 1701(a)(1990). In reality, the IEEPA codified the
principles of the TWEA to apply to a peacetime crisis.
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peril to the United States.
The Export Administration Act ("EAA"), another statute by
which the President may impose foreign trade restrictions, serves
as a "shield" to deflect perceived harm from the United States.8
The EAA, commonly referred to as the antiboycott statute, was.
promulgated to preclude persons subject to its jurisdiction from re-
fusing to engage in business transactions pursuant to a boycott
agreement.' The EAA "shield" analogy was derived from the Act's
purpose of protecting American citizens and businesses from the
impact of foreign boycotts.1 °
The IEEPA and TWEA "are more in the nature of swords,
designed to promote affirmatively United States foreign policy."1
The IEEPA, and its lesser used counterpart TWEA, are the princi-
pal mechanisms by which the President can respond economically
to international crises. 2 The "sword" analogy was derived from
the statutes' purposes to exert economic coercion against a foreign
nation due to its unwillingness to abide by standards of interna-
tional decency and fair play.'" When used in combination, the
three statutes are designed to protect American interests both do-
mestic and abroad.
PROCEDURAL BARRIERS
A business seeking to recover contractual monies from a foreign
nation whose assets have been frozen, faces an intimidating barrier
of governmental "red tape" and legal maneuvering. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") regulates litigation against
foreign governments. 4 The FSIA sets forth exacting requirements
that must be met in order to successfully bring suit against a for-
eign power.' 5 Notable statutory requirements provide for specific
venues, designate distinctive service of process requirements, and
generally mandate an evidentiary hearing prior to obtaining a de-
8. 50 USC App § 2407 (Supp III 1979).
9. Stanley J. Marcuss and Eric L. Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United
States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 Colum J Transnatl L 439, 448-49
(1981). The EAA was originally a response to the domestic impact of the Arab boycott of
Israel. Marcuss and Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 20 Colum J Transnatl L at 448-
49.
10. Id (cited in note 9).
11. Id at 446-47 (cited in note 9).
12. Id at 460 (cited in note 9).
13. Id at 448-60 (cited in note 9).
14. 28 USC §§ 1602 et seq (1991).
15. 28 USC § 1608 (1991).
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fault judgment.'6 Moreover, in a lawsuit brought by a business
against a foreign nation, the State Department or Justice Depart-
ment will usually intervene on behalf of the foreign nation in order
to circumvent a default judgment. 17.
The United States Treasury Department's Office-of Foreign As-
sets Control ("OFAC") is responsible for the control of frozen as-
sets and for promulgating regulations concerning the maintenance
of such funds. 8 In the past, OFAC, relying on its interpretation of
the pertinent asset control regulation, required a business to first
obtain an OFAC-issued license before bringing suit against a for-
eign nation.19
Because of constitutional challenges to the licensing require-
ment, OFAC has proven more than willing to grant licenses to po-
tential litigants. This leniency was illustrated by a recent OFAC
comment'stating that the failure of a business to obtain a license-
prior to commencement of a suit against Iraq was "not terribly sig-
nificant."2 ° OFAC has at times, however, reared its political head
16. Id.
17. Neil E. McDonell, Thaw is Possible For Frozen Iraqi Assets, The National Law
Journal 25, 29 (July 27, 1992). See also National Airmotive Corporation v Government of
Iran, 499 F Supp 401, 403 (D DC 1980)(Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher filed
an affidavit requesting that the action be stayed pending a foreign policy determination);
and Real v Simon, 510 F2d 557, 563 n 6 (5th Cir 1975)(the State Department issued a press
release declaring that "Cuba will be denied the use of American Financial Facilities for
transfer of funds to Latin America for subversive purposes").
Justice Department or State Department intervention is accomplished by issuing a state-
ment of interest. The statement of interest generally consists of a written policy position
taken by the appropriate department concerning the litigation. McDonell suggested that
frequently such policy positions are politically motivated and compel the business to combat
its own government for access to the frozen assets. McDonell, The National Law Journal at
29.
Initially the Iraqis did not defend the lawsuits brought against them in the United States.
This resulted in businesses obtaining default judgments against Iraqi-owned entities in one
year or less. Recently the Iraqis have started to retain American attorneys to contest the
default judgments. Id.
18. See generally 31 CFR § 500 (1991).
19. See generally 31 CFR § 535 (1991)(Iran); and 31 CFR § 575 (1991)(Iraq). OFAC
relies on language as follows: "Unless authorized by a license expressly referring to this
section, the acquisition, transfer ... in any security (or evidence thereof) registered or in-
scribed in the name of any Iranian entity is prohibited ...." 31 CFR § 535.202 (1991).
20. McDonell, The National Law Journal at 29. See note 17 and accompanying text.
See also U.S. Concern Sues Iraq, Wall Street Journal B8 (March 11, 1991).
A number of federal courts have opined that OFAC's licensing requirement is an uncon-
stitutional intrusion on federal court jurisdiction. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Fernandez,
741 F2d 355, 360-61 (11th Cir 1984); National Airmotive, 499 F Supp at 405 n 5. Such
courts have generally held that either OFAC regulations did not require a license at all, or if
they did, the license was not needed until after a judgment for damages had been obtained.
Once such a judgment had been rendered, the business must obtain a license from OFAC in
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by opposing many of the attempts to unblock frozen assets, espe-
cially ones arising from the freezing of Iraqi assets.21
INITIAL BREAKTHROUGH
Two decisions, both arising in the estates and trusts context,
provide the seminal foundation by which a business can unblock
frozen assets in order to satisfy a contractual claim. 2 In Tagle v
Regan, which affirmed and expanded the Fifth Circuit's earlier de-
cision of Real v Simon, the heirs of a Cuban national had obtained
judgment from a Florida court, which opined that each heir was
entitled to one-third of the decedent's estate.2 3 The estate of the
Cuban-national decedent, consisting of cash and securities, had
been frozen since July 9, 1963, and was held by the Bank of Nova
Scotia in New York.24
Notwithstanding the Florida judgment, OFAC refused to grant
the heirs a license in order to unblock the frozen assets. 25 More-
over, OFAC declared that the Florida judgment violated OFAC
regulations by attempting to transfer frozen assets without an
OFAC-issued license.26 The heirs then brought suit against the
order to execute on the judgment. Dean Witter, 741 F2d at 361-62; and National Airmotive,
499 F Supp at 405.
21. McDonell, The National Law Journal at 29 (cited in note 17). McDonell sug-
gested that OFAC has vehemently opposed the unblocking of Iraqi assets due to President
Bush's desire to prevent disclosure of the United States government's earlier involvement
with Iraq dubbed by the media as "Iraqgate." Id (cited in note 17).
See also Bush Administration Assailed in Iraq Loan Probe, Facts on File, World News
Digest (May 14, 1992); Judge Calls For Special Prosecutor to Probe Bank's Role in Iraqi
Aid, Journal of Commerce 3A (June 4, 1992); Bush's Lawyer Tied to Iraq Export List
Changes, Los Angeles Times A5 (June 26, 1992).
See also note 53 and accompanying text.
22. Tagle v Regan, 643 F2d 1058 (5th Cir 1981); and Real, 510 F2d at 557.
23. Tagle, 643 F2d at 1058. Mercedes Tagle had died intestate in Cuba. She was
survived by her daughter, a naturalized citizen of the United States, her son, a permanent
alien resident in the United States, and another son, who was a citizen and resident of
Cuba. Id. The two surviving children, who resided in the United States, applied for a license
to unblock their shares of the assets. Id at 1059. The Secretary of Treasury rejected their
applications. Id.
24. Id. The assets were frozen pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulation, 31
CFR § 515 (1963).
25. Tagle, 643 F2d at 1059. The Department of Treasury proffered various arguments
to support its refusal to issue a license: (1) the issue was not properly before the appellate
court since the appellants' statement of the issue challenged the Treasury regulation on
constitutional grounds only; (2) the rights of Cuban creditors of the estate would be in-
fringed upon had any of the assets been distributed; and (3) if the appellants had prevailed,
Treasury regulations and Congressional purposes could be thwarted by "blocked foreign na-
tionals" shifting assets to unblocked individuals. Id at 1061 n 3, 1068.
26. Id at 1067.
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Treasury Department in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida seeking the court to declare that the
asset freeze was no longer in effect, or in the alternative, for a li-
cense to be issued to unblock their intestate shares.27 The district
court rejected both arguments holding that the asset freeze was
still in effect, and that the asset control regulations, as interpreted
by the court, precluded distribution to the decedent's heirs.2 8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
the earlier Florida judgment had neither violated OFAC regula-
tions nor run afoul of the asset freeze.29 The court reasoned that it
was the interest of the decedent (a Cuban national) to the blocked
assets that determined whether the estate distribution violated the
asset freeze. 30 At the death of the decedent, the intestate interest
passed to the heirs leaving no remaining interest to the blocked
assets, thus, by operation of law, extinguishing all property inter-
ests held by the Cuban national.3
Tagle and Real established the operative route by which to re-
cover specific frozen assets. First, the business must litigate the
claim to obtain a judicial decree specifying that the business is en-
titled to the funds. This is simply a determination by the court
that the business has an interest in the money. Once such an inter-
est has been adjudged, the claimant can then use the judgment to
obtain an order mandating that the OFAC issue a license to un-
block the specific assets. 3
Although this procedure appears relatively simple, OFAC oppo-
sition has caused more than one business to expend an inordinate
amount of time and money attempting to unblock assets. Recent
case law elucidates the typical OFAC tactic which generally fea-
tures an adversarial action against the business in its initial litiga-
tion to determine interests to the funds, followed by a refusal to
27. Id at 1058.
28. Id.
29. Id at 1069. It is important to note that the Fifth Circuit did not order the trans-
fer of assets without a license, but rather that OFAC had improperly denied the heirs a
license after the Florida court had conclusively established the heirs' interests in the dece-
dent's estate. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id at 1064. Simply stated, the court held that once the decedent passed away, no
interest in the blocked assets remained; therefore, the decedent's estate should be distrib-
uted. Id. See also Real, 510 F2d at 564.
A blocked individual, or a designated national, is defined as a person or entity that explic-
itly falls within the asset control regulation. 31 CFR §§ 501.302-06 (1992).
32. See generally Tagle, 643 F2d at 1058; Real, 510 F2d at 557; and McDonell, The
National Law Journal at 25 (cited in note 17).
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issue a license once the interest has been established, culminating
in an OFAC appeal from the trial court decision.
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JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF TAGLE AND REAL
Two recent cases adopted the reasoning found in Tagle and
Real, and expanded their rationales to apply to contractual obliga-
tions secured by a letter of credit. In the first case, Centrifugal
Casting Machine ("CCM"), an Oklahoma company, successfully
used the rationale of Tagle and Real to persuade the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals that OFAC should unfreeze specific frozen as-
sets.3 4 The company had entered into a contract to supply pipe for
exportation to Iraq. 5 Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait, the
company brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma seeking payment under the
contract.3 6
Shortly thereafter, Centrifugal and various non-Iraqi parties en-
tered into a confidential settlement for distribution of the disputed
$2.7 million letter of credit.3 7 The district court held that these
parties were entitled to the $2.7 million downpayment made under
the standby letter of credit issued by the Central Bank of Iraq.
The court ordered the American Bank of Tulsa ("ABT"),
Centrifugal's agent, to distribute the funds pursuant to the settle-
ment agreement. 8
33. See note 53 and accompanying text.
34. Centrifugal, 966 F2d at 1348.
35. Id at 1349.
36. Id at 1348-50. The contract called for a letter of credit to secure payment. The
essential function of a letter of credit is to assure a party to an agreement that it will receive
the benefits of its performance. Wood v R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 888 F2d 313, 317 (3d Cir
1989).
In this case, Centrifugal Casting Company ("CCM") was the beneficiary of the letter,
which was issued by the Central Bank of Iraq ("CBI") to fund the contract. Centrifugal, 966
F2d at 1351-52. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro ("BNL") was the confirming bank which be-
came directly liable to CCM, and the Iraqi-owned State Machinery Trading Company
("SMTC") was the bank customer or account party. Id.
For additional discussion of letters of credit see note 1 and accompanying text.
37. Id at 1350.
38. Id at 1348-51. CCM entered into a contract with SMTC, an agency of the Iraqi
government, under which CCM was to provide pipe equipment to SMTC for a contract
price of $28 million. Id at 1349. The contracting parties had agreed that the payment mech-
anism was an irrevocable letter of credit issued by CBI, confirmed by'BNL, to the benefit of
CCM. Id at 1349-50. A standby letter of credit for $2.7 million was issued by BNL to ABT
for the benefit of CCM. Id at 1350. In pre-trial procedural maneuvering, CCM, BNL, and
ABT entered into a settlement agreement for distribution of the disputed $2.7 million. Id.
The court ordered ABT to distribute the funds pursuant to the settlement agreement. Id.
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OFAC intervened and argued that the downpayment should re-
main in a frozen account rather than be distributed to the non-
Iraqi parties pursuant to the settlement agreement. 9 OFAC fur-
ther contended that the district court's opinion had illegally deter-
mined rights to the down payment and accompanying letter of
credit in contravention to OFAC regulations."' The district court
rejected OFAC's -argument and OFAC appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.
41
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision holding
that the downpayment should be unfrozen and distributed to the
non-Iraqi parties.42 The court's opinion relied on simple contract
law holding that: (1) Iraq failed to retain an interest in the down-
payment; (2) the non-Iraqi parties did have an interest in the
money; and (3) that OFAC should issue a license to facilitate the
unfreezing of the $2.7 million in frozen funds.' 3 The decision cut
through the political "red tape" and created a two-prong inquiry
as to whether frozen assets should be unfrozen to pay a contractual
39. Id. OFAC asserted that since the $2.7 million was a downpayment between CCC
and SMTC and because the contract had not been fully completed, the Iraqi-entity, SMTC
retained a property interest in the downpayment; therefore, ariy transfer of funds was in
violation of the asset control regulation. Id at 1350 relying on 31 CFR § 575.201(a).
Section 575.201(a) provides that "no property or interests in property of the Government
of Iraq that are in the United States . . . may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or
otherwise dealt in." 31 CFR § 575.201(a).
40. Id at 1350. OFAC maintained that Iraq retained a property interest in the $2.7
million downpayment. A subsequent transfer of funds would have violated the asset control
regulation. Id. See note 39 and accompanying text.
41. Id. By ordering ABT to distribute the $2.7 million downpayment pursuant to the
settlement terms, the district court rejected OFAC's argument that Iraq retained a property
interest in the downpayment. Id.
42. Id at 1352-54.
43. Id at 1352-54. The court held that no legal authority existed to support OFAC's
contention that a potential breach of contract claim, prior to commencement of litigation,
gives a "putative plaintiff a legally cognizable property interest in the assets of a putative
defendant." Id at 1353.
The court relied heavily upon its earlier determinations that the issuer of a letter of credit
must honor a proper demand even though the beneficiary has breached the underlying con-
tract, even though the insolvency of the account party renders reimbursement impossible,
and notwithstanding supervening illegality, impossibility, war or insurrection. Ward Petro-
leum Corp. v FDIC, 903 F2d 1297, 1299-1300 (10th Cir 1990); Uniform Commercial Code §
5-114, comment 1; Wood, 888 F2d at 318; KMW International v Chase Manhattan Bank,
606 F2d 10, 16 (2d Cir 1979).
Incredibly the United States government, via OFAC, argued that Iraq had a property
interest in the downpayment. It contended that the downpayment constituted a contract
payment made by Iraq, and since- CCC breached the contract by failing to complete its
obligations, Iraq should recover the downpayment. Centrifugal, 966 F2d at 1353. This in
essence, was the United States government making a breach of contract claim on behalf of a
nation it had been at war with. Id.
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claim: (1) does the foreign nation that is subject to the asset freeze
have any interest in the specific funds to be unblocked; and (2)
does the claimant have an identifiable interest in the specific fro-
zen assets. If the foreign government has no interest and the
American claimant can establish an interest, then OFAC should
have no recourse but to issue a license to unblock specific monies.""
The decisions in Centrifugal and later in Engel clearly effectuate
the purpose of an asset freeze. Iraq had no interest in the funds
and was not benefitted by their release. Furthermore, the frozen
assets were used to compensate American businesses for claims
each had against Iraq.
In the second case, Engel Industries, a Missouri manufacturer,
brought suit against First American Bank and Medcon Enterprises
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.45
Engel had agreed to manufacture machinery intended for export to
Iraq.4 After the assembly drawings were complete, but prior to the
actual assembly of the machinery, Iraq invaded Kuwait, thereby
prompting President Bush to order a freeze on all United States-
held Iraqi assets.47 Engel sought payment under the letter of credit
and damages for breach of contract."'
OFAC initially adopted the position that the funds under the
letter of credit were blocked pursuant to the asset freeze and that
no payment could be unfrozen without an OFAC-issued license.4"
44. See generally Centrifugal, 966 F2d at 1348. See also note 21 and accompanying
text.
45. Engel Industries, Inc. v Medcon, 1992 WL 157273 (D DC). Medcon Enterprises
was intending to sell roll forming machinery to the government of Iraq. The Central Bank of
Iraq had agreed to provide the funds necessary to Medcon so that it could open a letter of
credit with First American Bank. Engel, 1992 WL 157273 at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id. See also 31 CFR § 575 (1991).
48. Engel, 1992 WL 157273 at 1-3. Engel and Medcon, the contractual parties, agreed
that Medcon would open a letter of credit at First American Bank ("FAB") in favor of
Engel. Id at 1. Engel was to deliver the goods to its factory in Missouri. Id. Once delivered,
Engel was to present the shipping documents to Mercantile Bank to recover the balance of
the letter of credit. Id. Engel completed the general assembly drawings and withdrew the
downpayment pursuant to the contractual agreement. Id at 2. Shortly thereafter, President
Bush imposed a freeze on. all Iraqi assets. Id. FAB wrote Engel advising that it was prohib-
ited under the asset freeze to honor the letter of credit. Id. Despite this information, Engel
completed performance under the contract and declared itself willing and able to contractu-
ally perform. Id. Engel presented the necessary documents to Mercantile Bank, at which
time FAB informed both Mercantile and Engel that it would not accept the documents. Id.
Engel sold part of the equipment in an effort to mitigate damages, and brought suit against
Medcon to recover lost profits and damages for breach of contract. Id.
49. Id. OFAC issued a letter ruling in October 1990 declaring that the letter of credit
was blocked under the asset freeze and that no payment could be contemplated without an
1993
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OFAC then abruptly changed tack and declared that Engel was
entitled to payment under the letter of credit upon the ground
that the contract was "incidental to a domestic transaction of un-
blocked property."5 With rare OFAC support, Engel was able to
obtain a summary judgment, thereby paving the way for it to re-
ceive payment under the letter of credit."
The opinions rendered in Engel and Centrifugal clearly demon-
strate that the federal courts have recognized the importance of
international trade, and that payment under a letter of credit
should be accomplished regardless of the unforeseen political diffi-
culties.2 However, given that past experience is not sufficiently
uniform, it may be premature to raise a presumption that OFAC
has embraced the courts' increasing inclinations to permit frozen
assets to be unblocked in order to satisfy contractual claims. In
fact, the relationship between OFAC and businesses aiming to un-
block frozen assets remains adversarial.53
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
A business contemplating entry into the international trade
arena should take several protective measures to help insulate it-
self against non-payment via an asset freeze. Most importantly, the
business should demand that all payments for contractual obliga-
OFAC license. Id at 3. The OFAC letter was attached as Exhibit A to Answer, filed July 8,
1991. Id.
50. Id at 3-6. The court used the exact rationale used in Centrifugal. It analyzed the
letter of credit; determined pursuant to applicable commercial law that Engel was entitled
to payment; ensured that no Iraqi entities retained an interest in the specific funds; and
ordered OFAC to issue a license to release payment. Id. See also UCC §§ 2-610, 2-616, and
2-703.
It is suggested that OFAC changed course in response to pending litigation in which
courts were rejecting OFAC arguments and unblocking frozen funds to pay contractual
claims. McDonell, The National Law Journal at 28 (cited in note 17).
51. Engel, 1992 WL 157273 at 3-6.
52. The Engel court cogently wrote: "Letters of credit serve an extremely important
purpose in the commerce of this nation and indeed the world. They facilitate complex com-
mercial transactions by assuring parties like Engel that they will be paid if they complete
their performances under contracts that they make." Id at 6.
53. The courts have increasingly rejected OFAC's repeated arguments opposing the
unblocking of frozen assets. Although OFAC opposed each of the following cases, each of the
claimants prevailed in unblocking the frozen assets: Consarc Corporation v Iraqi Ministry
of Industry and Minerals, 90 Civ 2269 (D DC 1991)(Consarc awarded a $64 million default
judgment); First City, Texas-Houston v Rafidain Bank and Central Bank of Iraq, 90 Civ
7360 (S D NY 1990)(First City awarded $53.2 million); The Commercial Bank of Kuwait v
Rafidain Bank, 91 Civ 6500 (S D NY 1991); Goodman Holdings v Rafidain Bank, 91 Civ
2530 (D DC 1991); and Brown & Root, Inc. v State Company for Oil Proceeds, 91 Civ 594 (S
D Tex 1991)(Brown & Root awarded $17.6 million).
338
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tions be secured with an irrevocable letter of credit. 4 The financ-
ing agreement should stipulate exact payment releases as the dif-
ferent contractual obligations are reached. 5 Additionally, the
business should ensure the financial arrangement is structured so
that once the irrevocable letter of credit has been issued, the for-
eign nation retains no property interest in the monies." The pro-
tective measures are based on a simplified analysis of the conclu-
sions reached in Engel and Centrifugal: (1) if it is determined that
the business holds a legal interest in the monies; and (2) it is deter-
mined that the foreign nation does not retain an interest in the
monies; then (3) under such factual situations, the asset control
regulation will not be violated by releasing the funds.5 7
LEGISLATIVE INACTION
Disjunctive opinions from OFAC coupled with political thrusts
and parries from other governmental departments have impaired
the judicially-created mechanism by which a business can unblock
frozen assets. It has necessitated that a business seeking to un-
block the funds must battle its own government while incurring
substantial legal fees along the way. A cry for legislative support
and the creation of a new procedure has fallen on deaf ears .5
Early legislative discussion was encouraging for businesses seek-
ing to release blocked assets. In 1965, in connection with the 1963
Cuban assets freeze, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ad-
vised the Treasury Department that frozen assets, wholly or sub-
54. This argument is supported by the reasoning set forth in Centrifugal and Engel.
The letter of credit is essential to international trade and the obligation of the issuing bank
to honor the beneficiary's demand is independent of political considerations or governmen-
tal actions. See generally Centrifugal, 966 F2d at 1348; and Engel, 1992 WL 157273 at 1.
The courts in Centrifugal and Engel clearly opined that a beneficiary under an irrevocable
letter of credit held a property interest in the frozen assets, and that the account party, or
issuing party, did not retain an interest in the frozen funds. Thus, the asset control regula-
tion would not be violated upon a specific distribution. See generally Centrifugal, 966 F2d
at 1348; and Engel, 1992 WL 157273 at 1.
55. The theory behind this is that if the business was physically unable to complete
all contractual obligations prior to the asset freeze, some payment, albeit reduced, may be
unblocked. See generally Engel, 1992 WL 157273 at 1-3 (Engel had completed drawings of
the machinery, but had yet to start assembling the machinery).
56. This is the crux of the holding in Centrifugal. If the blocked nation or individual
does not retain a property interest in the frozen assets, the purpose of the asset freeze is not
circumvented by a subsequent release order. Centrifugal, 966 F2d at 1350-51. See note 43
and accompanying text.
57. See generally Centrifugal, 966 F2d at 1348 and Engel, 1992 WL 157273 at 1.




stantially owned by United States citizens and residents, should be
unblocked 5 9 The House of Representatives also issued a report
recommending that the Treasury Department conduct a "thorough
examination" on a case-by-case basis, to determine the proper dis-
position of United States national-owned blocked assets and that,
where proper, it unblock United States privately-owned assets.6 0
Recent legislative responses have been nonexistent. In 1991,
there was some talk by OFAC and the State Department to seek
legislation that would empower the United States Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission ("FCSC") to settle American claims
against Iraq and use the $1.4 billion of Iraqi assets frozen in the
United States to fund these awards." As of this date, no such leg-
islation has been proposed.
RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION
Asset freezes are rapidly becoming a favored political tool. Legis-
lation is needed to continue to foster growth in international trade,
as well as to help protect businesses from the unforeseen asset
freeze and its accompanying political complications. The following
five point proposal would provide a business with a streamlined
method by which to unblock frozen assets as well as to significantly
reduce the time and cost of recovery:
(1) The FCSC or a similar entity would be empowered to specifically hear
claims brought by businesses and residents seeking to unblock frozen assets;
(2) Businesses or individuals would be required to submit a proof of claim
to the FCSC or other similar entity, thereby eliminating the need for full
blown evidentiary hearings;
(3) Once the proof of claim has been filed, the FCSC or other similar entity
would make a determination of interests ensuring that the business had a
legally cognizable claim to the funds and that the foreign nation subject to
the freeze did not retain an interest in the funds;
(4) Once the FCSC or other similar entity made a determination that the
business or individual had an interest in the funds, OFAC would be directed
to issue the appropriate license to ensure the unfreezing of the specific
amount;
(5) OFAC would be limited to promulgating regulations concerning the
maintenance of frozen assets and proper licensing procedures. OFAC's op-
position to the unblocking of frozen assets would be restricted to the pro-
ceedings held before the FCSC or other similar entity.
The proposed legislation would create an adjudicatory board
59. US Code Cong & Ad News 3581, 3585 (1965); see also Tagle, 643 F2d at 1061-62.
60. HR Rep No 706, 89th Cong, 1st Sess 7 (1965).
61. McDoneIl, The National Law Journal at 29 (cited in note 17).
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comprised of members more concerned with issues such as whether
the business is legally entitled to the claim, and whether the for-
eign nation retains an interest in the monies. It would eliminate
politically-motivated attacks from OFAC and other governmental
departments. The legislation would also curb excessive legal fees
incurred by a business seeking to unblock frozen assets.
Unless Congress acts to solve the problem, litigation in this area
will certainly increase. The United States government lacks plans
to create any alternative forum or method for adjudicating these
claims. A business is at the mercy of the shifting political winds at
a time when international capital and growth is desperately
needed. A solid legislative plan, such as the one suggested by this
author, would serve to alleviate some of the "fear of the unknown,"
and ensure that if a business contracts with a foreign nation and
meets its obligations, it will be compensated for its work.
Douglas M. Hottle

